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Abstract 
The ubiquitous reliability of the modern airliner has engendered a significant change in the 
traditional causes of aircraft accidents. Engine reliability in particular, coupled with 
sophisticated systems for flight path awareness such as Enhanced Ground Proximity 
Warning Systems (EGPWS), Vertical Situation Displays (VSD’s), Head Up Displays (HUD’s) 
and Electronic Flight Bags (EFB’s), have greatly decreased the prevalence of controlled 
flight into terrain (CFIT) accidents.  Inflight loss of control (ILOC) has become far more 
common than CFIT, often as a result of automation anomalies, failures or mismanagement. 
With engine failures and fires becoming relatively rare, it is the novel and unexpected 
events, coupled with human related mismanagement of those events, often through a lack of 
knowledge and/or expectation, which are weighing on modern accident statistics. A project 
was completed over 10 weeks at an Australasian Airline, where pilots were encouraged to 
discuss novel event scenarios. It was hypothesised that discussion of novel events would, in 
the absence of actual practice, develop a mental plan for the management of such events 
and also raise levels of expectation for such events. At the completion of the project all the 
pilots were asked to complete an online survey which outlined their perceptions of project 
utility, expectation and efficacy as a result of the discussions. While only 44% of available 
pilots responded, results were overwhelmingly positive. 
 
Introduction 
One of the benefits of continuous development and improvement in aircraft technology is an 
increase in aircraft reliability, both in engine reliability and aircraft systems reliability. This has 
obvious effects on flight safety, with events such as engine failures becoming very rare. In the last 
decade for example, across the world there were only two fatalities due to powerplant related systems 
malfunctions. This is remarkable given the average total of around 40 million flight hours per annum 
in jet aircraft with over 60,000lbs Maximum Takeoff Weight (Boeing, 2010).  
The downside of this inherent reliability however, is the conditioned expectation that pilots 
develop that little will go wrong. Day after day of reliable operation without failure leads to an 
involuntary complacency brought about by a realistic expectation that the aircraft will not fail. 
However, aircraft accidents are still occurring – it is simply the nature of the cause which has 
morphed in recent years. Instead of engine failures and fires, or controlled flight into terrain, a new 
breed of problems is becoming more widespread. Loss of control due to breakdowns in situational 
awareness or poor decision making, coupled with auto mation mismanagement are commonly cited in 
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today’s statistics. Indeed the type of accident or incident which features most commonly in 
contemporary incidents and accidents is the Inflight Loss of Control (I-LOC) which is often caused by 
the novel, unexpected event, which may never have even been considered by the pilots who 
experience it (Boeing, 2010; Rosenkrans, 2010;  Taleb, 2010). 
While the emphasis on pilot recurrency training and checking around the world remains centred on 
engine failure/fire management and handling, the reality is that these events are rare. Even with this 
training, pilots only practise emergency management for perhaps four days per year, with the other 
360+ days flying on normal line operations, often with little or no exposure to non-normal events. It is 
not hard to see why this conditioned sense of normality occurs, and the lack of expectation of a non-
normal event is simply a normal reaction to enduring normality. When some unexpected non-normal 
event does occur then, the lack of expectation and preparedness for such an event commonly leads to 
a heightened state of acute stress, with ensuing deleterious effects on information processing, 
situational awareness, decision making, and other important facets of the human machine interface.  
The hypothesis proffered in this research project was that creating an increased level of 
expectation for novel events, would allow pilots to develop a “cognitive pre-plan”, a schema or 
mental model, which they would be able to recall under stress in the event that some novel event 
occurred in the future. While the best method for developing these preconceived plans for dealing 
with novel problems would be to practise them repeatedly in the simulator, the practicality and 
expense of this is unrealistic. As a free alternative then, it was hypothesised that simple discussions 
about novel events, during the ample quiet time that occurs in international operations, would still 
allow pilots to develop these “cognitive pre-plans”, which may simply be management processes 
which are transferable between different novel events, which would in turn build a level of efficacy 
for coping with such an event should it happen for real in the future.   
Over a ten week period from early April to mid June 2010, an internal research project was 
conducted at a predominantly International Airline which operates 737’s within the Australasian 
region. This project was entitled “What would you do if...?” and was designed to gauge pilot 
perceptions of relevance and utility in the use of novel event discussions to build a sense of efficacy 
for handling future novel emergency events. Pilots were asked to spend some free time enroute each 
day, discussing one or more novel events, including how they would manage them, who they would 
talk to, what actions they would take, what checklists they would use etc. At the end of the ten weeks, 
pilots were asked to complete a simple seven question survey on-line, which was used to gauge their 
perception of utility and value in the discussions. A total of 57 pilots responded to the survey from a 
total possible number of 128 pilots (44.5%). Of the responses approximately half were received 
equally from both Captains and First Officers, with a wide range of experience levels evident. Results 
were overwhelmingly positive and will be discussed further. 
 
SURVEY RESULTS 
The survey consisted of seven questions: two demographic questions and five questions on the 
exercise itself. A breakdown of the survey questions with the results are outlined below. 
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Part 1: Demographics 
Question 1: Are you a Captain or a First Officer? 
 
Captain 28 
First Officer 28 
No Response 1 
 
 
 
The responses were evenly shared between Captains and First Officers. This seems somewhat 
logical given the two-way nature of the exercise, however prior to the survey, it was expected that a 
majority of responses would come from First Officers who were keen to expand their knowledge as a 
preparatory measure for commands. The fact that an equal number of Captains and First Officers 
responded suggests that Captains were just as interested in developing their personal database for 
dealing with novel situations as First Officers.  This is encouraging, and perhaps points to recognition 
of the underlying reality of the threat associated with novel, unexpected events on flight safety. 
 
Question 2: Approximately how many flying hours have you flown? 
< 5000 hours 10 
5000 - 7500 hours 16 
7500 – 10000 hours 9 
10000 – 15000 hours 11 
> 15000 hours 11 
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The amount of flying hours each respondent had flown presents some interesting information. It 
was anticipated that senior First Officers and junior Captains in the 5,000-10,000 hour band would be 
the largest group of respondents, with First Officers due for command keen to explore new scenarios 
and develop some expertise in problem solving prior to command training, and junior Captains who 
are perhaps relatively new to the role who are still keen to develop their experience base in a problem 
focussed methodology.  
Of particular  interest here are the number of very experienced pilots who chose to participate in 
the survey. Of the 57 respondents, 38% of respondents (n=22) were pilots with over 10,000 flying 
hours. Half of these were in the very experienced category (>15,000 hours), and this perhaps suggests 
two things: firstly, many of these would have started their careers on less reliable aircraft and are 
therefore intrinsically conditioned to expect failures at a higher level than pilots of less experience; 
and secondly, the more experienced pilots are possibly the ones who would have been engaged more 
by First Officers seeking to tap into their wide experience base.  
The following graphs show the breakdown between Captain and First Officer experience levels 
amongst those who responded to the survey. 
 
 
Captain Hours 
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First Officer Hours 
The fact that so many experienced First Officers and Captains participated in and responded to the 
survey suggests an awareness of the problems of automation reliability complacency effects. 
 
Part 2: Survey Questions 
Question 3: How often did you discuss novel or emergency events during the trial? 
Never   3 
Occasionally 34 
Regularly 15 
Every day 1 
 More than Once per day 3 
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The results in this section are somewhat predictable. Convincing people to do something on a 
repetitive basis as part of a research project, is always a difficult job. Where people are not forced to 
do something then boredom, fatigue, lack of perceived personal relevance, and general lethargy, will 
often make it difficult for people to be motivated to participate. The amount of hours flown in a given 
trip, or a month, the perceived worth of the project, and the perceived benefits of the exercise, are also 
cognitive inertia hurdles that must be overcome. 
Perhaps surprising is that a handful of people actually participated in the exercises every day, or 
more than once a day. This indicates intrinsic interest, an underlying motivation (for example  those 
close to command), and an ability to see the benefits of the exercise.  
Of the respondents, only three people admitted to not participating at all, although the overall 
statistics are undoubtedly distorted here. It is likely that the wide proportion of non-respondents in the 
survey (n=71) did not participate in the scenario exercises, or if they did, felt insufficiently motivated 
by the benefits of the exercise to complete the on-line survey instrument. Of those who did participate 
the results to follow indicate an overwhelmingly positive response to the exercise, however this must 
be tempered by the number of people who didn’t actually participate at all. 
 
Question 4: Do you think that these discussions have raised your expectation level for surprise 
events? 
Not at all 1 
Slightly 10 
Moderately 22 
Significantly 20 
Not applicable 2 
  
 
One of the concerning things that comes out of the ubiquitous reliability of modern aircraft is a 
conditioned expectation of normality. As recently as twenty or thirty years ago, the reliability of 
aircraft engines and systems was considerably lower, and pilots developed a healthy respect for the 
vagaries of aircraft reliability, with a moderate level of failure expectation. It is not inconceivable that 
a large proportion of pilots joining the industry today could reasonably expect to complete their 
careers having never suffered a real engine failure, a concept foreign to those who perhaps joined the 
industry in the sixties or seventies. 
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The result of this question is encouraging in that the mere discussion of novel events, has raised 
expectation levels amongst a considerable number of respondents. Simply highlighting the concept of 
conditioned complacency has at least raised the level of awareness of the problem. To achieve this 
long term would perhaps require an ongoing programme of novel event discussions, and some 
attention during simulator recurrency training to more novel events.  To highlight the problem is one 
thing, but to see continued development of capabilities in handling such events would perhaps require 
some organisational interventions. 
 
Question 5: As a result of these discussions would you say that you have learned anything new? 
No 0 
A small amount 14 
A reasonable amount 24 
Learned a lot 15 
Not applicable 2 
 
 
 
The majority of positive responses in this question came from First Officers, which is perhaps 
understandable, although some Captains still felt that they had learned a reasonable amount or in 
some cases learned a lot.  
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Captains’ Learning 
 
First Officers’ Learning 
The fact that the vast majority of respondents learned something suggests that the scenario 
discussions were effective. New learning which is reinforced through repetition and developed by 
mutual problem solving, has the ability to be recalled from long term memory even under the effects 
of acute stress. Strong memories are relatively impervious to stress effects which is why emergency 
checklist recall items should be regularly revisited (Collins, Gathercole, Conway, & Morris, 1993). 
The expansion of pilot knowledge capabilities is one part of developing self-efficacy (Bandura, 
1977). Where a challenging situation develops in the aircraft, the degree of stress experienced is 
largely relative to individual and crew perceptions of task management capability. Totally novel, and 
previously unconsidered events, are likely to engender significant stress, while events that are already 
in pilots’ knowledge structures are likely to be viewed with some sense of control, engendering more 
manageable stress effects. The greater the knowledge database, the greater the chance of positive 
appraisals.
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Question 6: As a result of these discussions do you think that you would be better prepared to 
handle one of these novel or emergency events if it happened unexpectedly? 
No 1 
Slightly 7 
Moderately 22 
Significantly 25 
Not applicable 2 
 
 
Pilots who have worked through a novel emergency scenario and developed a workable solution 
are much more likely to feel that the situation is controllable. This feeling of capability is likely to 
induce problem-focussed coping mechanisms during stressful situations, rather than emotion-focussed 
coping mechanisms such as denial or dissociation which can have substantially negative effects on 
situation outcome (Martin, Murray & Bates, 2010). 
The overwhelmingly positive response to this question suggests that respondents felt that they had 
developed some new capabilities to deal with novel emergencies, and as a result would be better 
prepared should some similar situation occur. Positive individual interpretation of capabilities to deal 
with emergencies is an important facet in developing self-confidence and self-efficacy. 
Of the respondents who suggested they would be moderately or significantly more prepared to 
handle a novel emergency as a result of the scenario discussions, the pre-survey hypothesis was that 
First Officers had the most to learn, and would form the majority here, however, results were almost 
equally split between Captains and First Officers (n=23 versus n=25). This suggests that Captains’ 
perceptions of utility were very high generally. 
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Question 7: Is it likely that you will continue to discuss such events in the future without 
being asked to, now that the trial is over? 
No 1 
Occasionally 33 
Regularly 20 
Frequently 3 
 
 
 
This question raises an interesting situation going forward. Rather than being bored by talking 
about novel emergencies, a considerable number of pilots felt that the exercise was so worthwhile that 
they would continue to discuss novel emergency scenarios in the future, with a significant proportion 
(40%) suggesting they would do so on a regular or even frequent basis. Only one respondent felt that 
the exercise was not worth repeating, and that person was one who had not actually participated in the 
scenario discussions. 
This question is directly related to the previous question in that those who felt the exercise was 
useful tended to say that they would continue the discussions even though the research project is over. 
The utility of the discussions was clearly effective for the majority of those who participated and this 
utility created an intrinsic motivation for more scenario discussions.  
 
DISCUSSION 
Expectation is borne out of repetition and context, and can be conditioned in such a way as to 
induce unintentional complacency. Where nothing out of the ordinary happens day after day, the brain 
unwittingly becomes conditioned to normalcy, and levels of expectation for unexpected or novel 
events appear to dwindle. This has led on numerous occasions in recent years, to situations of acute 
stress being experienced during unexpected events, which have in turn been poorly handled. In some 
cases this has resulted in serious incidents, accidents or undesired aircraft states. 
The reliability of modern aircraft has enhanced overall flight safety significantly, and by and large, 
as technology improves, system reliability will continue to become less of a factor in aircraft accident 
causation. Systems such as Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning Systems, Head Upper Displays, 
Vertical Situation Displays, and even Electronic Flight Bags, have contributed tremendously to a 
reduction in Controlled Flight into Terrain and Loss of Situational Awareness (SA) events. Inflight 
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Loss of Control (ILOC) has now become the biggest cause of accidents, in what has been a relatively 
quick transition from CFIT as the historically principal cause over the last few decades (Boeing, 
2010). 
The one thing which has had constant presence is the human factor in aircraft mishaps. The nature 
of the human-machine interface has changed somewhat, but the complexity of the ever-more 
sophisticated automation has simply resulted in a different type of human error, rather than reducing 
it. Breakdowns in SA are commonly noted in ILOC statistics, and this is largely due to the complexity 
and lack of transparency in the automation, but also due to breakdowns in vigilance and attention due 
to an over-reliance on machine perfection.  
Airlines go to great lengths to encourage pilot standardisation, and repeated replication of routines, 
such as scans, flows and checklists. The hypothetical clone that did everything the same flight after 
flight, without error, would in some ways make an ideal airline pilot, although such an individual 
would lack the flexibility to deal with the real-life dynamic realities of the aviation environment. The 
one thing which does come from reliance on Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and repetition is a 
mentality of habit. This is a positive in terms of error management strategies, but has the longer term 
effect of operant conditioning, which may include a gradual trend towards complacency (Alkov, 
Gaynor, & Borowsky, 1985). A gradual drift towards complacency, developed slowly through month 
after month, year after year of normalcy in operations, is a natural human tendency, and one that is 
often only modified by a significant complacency disruption event, such as an emergency. Where that 
emergency involves a novel situation, which is largely unexpected due to conditioned expectation of 
normalcy, then the surprise of the event, coupled with the complexity of a novel solution, can 
sometimes overwhelm the capabilities of the unsuspecting individual (Thackray, 1988).  
Brain plasticity theory suggests that the more associations are made, the greater the ready access 
there is to semantic and episodic memory structures (Andreassi, 2007; Collins, Gathercole, Conway, 
& Morris, 1993; Ratey, 2002). Novel situations which have not been previously considered at all, 
require an extensive amount of working memory capacity to develop a creative solution, at a time 
when acute stress has a significantly deleterious effect on working memory function. Where pilots 
have previously experienced a situation, either directly or vicariously through discussion, then the 
level of self-efficacy is likely to be considerably greater, which has a positive effect on stress levels 
and therefore working memory function (Bandura, 1977).  
Stress is an individual’s reaction to their perception of threat, and it manifests itself 
physiologically, emotionally, and cognitively (Cox, 1978; Stokes & Kite, 1994). The perception of 
threat comes about through a conditioning process, a gradual learning of what is fearful and what 
isn’t, which we develop throughout our lives. The amygdala, which is part of the emotional centre of 
the brain, is largely responsible for this appraisal of threatening stimuli, and is continuously involved 
in evaluating the environment for meaningful components (Le Doux, 2000). Where the amygdala 
does detect something which has been previously associated with harm, threat, loss, or even 
challenge, then it will induce autonomic bodily reactions to help manage those stressors (Duckworth, 
Bargh, Garcia, & Chaiken, 2002). These are commonly referred to as “fight or flight”  reactions, and 
involve the activation of the sympathetic nervous system which enables the individual to deal 
physically with a threatening situation, and to orient the attentional system.  
The other role of the amygdala and its related brain structures is the ongoing evaluation of coping 
mechanisms which would relieve the stress. This “secondary appraisal” is a process designed to 
alleviate an organism’s stress by employing compensatory or coping strategies in order to return it to 
a state of homeostasis, or neutrality. These coping mechanisms may be long term strategies (generally 
called defence mechanisms) or may be short term, dynamic solutions employed to ease the perception 
of the situation. 
Coping mechanisms fall under two distinct categories: problem focussed coping, and emotion 
focussed coping (Lazarus, 1966, 1999). Problem focussed coping strategies are generally employed 
where the individual has some control over the situation and can take some positive action to change 
or remove the problem (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). This is largely a rational, orchestrated mechanism 
which facilitates normal information processing, with nominal working memory and long term 
memory function. 
The second form of coping is the principal area for concern. Emotion focussed coping is generally 
employed where an individual feels no control over the situation, and is forced to take some 
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withdrawl type action to avoid the harsh reality of the situation (Monat & Lazarus, 1991). Techniques 
such as denial are common in these types of situations, however other dissociative mechanisms such 
as freezing may also occur (Lynn & Rhue, 1994). Any of these emotion focussed coping mechanisms 
are very likely to be detrimental to situation outcome, and generally involve a partial or total 
breakdown in normal information processing.  
The following model proposes a conceptual relationship between appraisal, coping, and 
information processing. It distinguishes between appraisals which are benign, positive, or irrelevant, 
and therefore have no real effect on information processing, and those which involve harm/loss threat, 
or challenge. Of these, problem focussed coping mechanisms generally are positive means of 
effecting an actual change in the situation, and are effective means of dealing with problems, largely 
without breakdowns in information processing. Emotion focussed coping is simply a mechanism for 
changing the perception of a situation and may involve pathological processes which severely 
interfere with information processing. Any breakdowns in information processing will in turn 
adversely affect situational awareness and decision making. 
 
 
 
(Martin, Murray & Bates, 2010) 
The effects of individuals or even whole crews being bogged down in emotion-focussed coping 
strategies are potentially enormous, and real. The following accident was a typical example of an 
entire flight crew who had adopted a maladaptive coping mechanism and subsequently crashed after 
takeoff: 
 
“A Check Pilot was in the right seat, with the pilot being checked in the left seat. A third pilot, who 
was being checked next was in the front right passenger seat. The aircraft was making a simulated 
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engine failure after V1  following a number of other exercises. As the aircraft got airborne the Check 
Captain retarded the right power lever to idle to simulate an engine failure. The flying pilot, who 
noticed that more control force was necessary to rotate the aircraft than normal, tried to control the 
yaw induced by the loss of power, and attempted to use 5 degrees roll towards the live engine to assist 
with directional control. It quickly became obvious that something was not right and the flying pilot 
struggled to control the roll, while the rate of climb started to reduce, and a descent started. The 
aircraft’s right wing finally collided with the ILS Glideslope antenna tower some 25 seconds after the 
simulated engine failure. It transpired that full flap from the previous landing had not been reset to 
the takeoff flap position before commencing the takeoff. Neither the pilot at the controls nor the Check 
Captain did anything to arrest the slow right drift into the clearly illuminated ILS tower, or to recover 
speed/climb/acceleration capability by applying power to the idling right engine, despite the fact that 
there was at least 25 seconds in which either pilot could have taken action to prevent the accident.” 
(Heaslip, Hull, McLeod, & Vermil, 1991). 
 
This case wasn’t a particularly novel event, however the lack of performance was unexpected, 
even in the midst of emergency training. Because it varied from the expected course of events, the 
crew was unable to apply problem solving techniques and resorted instead to an emotion-focussed 
coping mechanism i.e. they froze. There are numerous other examples available of similar situations, 
invariably in situations which were unexpected and/or novel. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
A NASA study of airline crew performance found that 85 percent of “textbook” emergencies 
(those that the crews had trained for) were handled well, while only seven percent of “new” 
emergency situations were handled with the same degree of success (Peterson 2007). This suggests 
that novel events are poorly considered in normal line operations and warrant further consideration. 
The “What would you do if....?” exercise was designed to gauge pilot perceptions of utility for 
discussion based scenario management for novel, unexpected events. The hypothesis was that simply 
talking about novel events, and creating solutions in a relaxed, stress free environment, would allow 
pilots to develop a cognitive “pre-plan” which could be stored away as a long-term memory, to be 
revisited in the event that such a situation, or even some unrelated novel event ever occurred for real. 
Having a “model” solution to a complex problem already stored away, lets individuals use that 
knowledge to resolve future situations very quickly, simply by using or modifying a solution which 
has already been determined to work. The alternative, where a complex novel situation is encountered 
without having been previously considered, requires an enormous amount of cognitive effort, at a 
time when information processing is severely impaired by stress, and possibly at the expense of other 
processes such as situation awareness. 
The vast majority of respondents in the survey (95%) expressed the opinion that they had learned 
from the exercise and would be better prepared in the future as a result, and that they were so 
cognisant of the utility of the exercise (98%) that they would continue to discuss novel scenarios, even 
after the project had finished. These statistics are perhaps distorted by the fact that over half the pilot 
population available did not respond, and it is quite likely that the majority of those may not have 
participated in scenario discussions, or did so sparingly. 
The positive benefits of novel event scenario discussions appear evident from the survey results. 
Greater sense of self-efficacy, greater breadth and depth of technical and operational knowledge, and 
an increased level of expectation for such events, are some of the immediately obvious benefits. 
Ancillary benefits may be improved scan rates, better vigilance, and greater system awareness, which 
come about simply through greater levels of concentration and attention. 
Encouraging pilots to discuss novel events where time permits is likely to have positive effects 
during the management of future novel events. The scope of scenario discussions is only limited by 
imagination, and the greater the number of novel events considered, the wider the benefits that will 
ensue. As part of Command Upgrade training, new Captains would be ideally encouraged to develop 
the habit of scenario discussion and to take it forward with them onto the line.  
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Further research is warranted across a wider and more diverse sample. The effects of various 
national cultures on scenario acceptance would be variables worth further analysis also. 
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